Do Managerial Practices Matter in Innovation and Firm Performance Relations? New Evidence from the UK by Nemlioglu, I & Mallick, SK
Do Managerial Practices Matter in
Innovation and Firm Performance
Relations? New Evidence from the UK
Ilayda Nemlioglu and Sushanta K. Mallick




The innovation and firm performance relationship remains a puzzle, as all types of
innovation are not equally beneficial. Besides, better-managed firms can perform
better. Integrating these two strands of literature, we examine whether managerial
practices explain this relationship using data from UK firms during 1992–2014.
We find that firms which focus on R&D activities jointly with better managerial
practices benefit favourably. During the post-crisis period, higher intangibles are
only beneficial when combined with R&D activity. Also firms with better
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1. Introduction
While investigating the relationship between innovation and firm performance, the key
unresolved question is whether higher intellectual capital is beneficial or unfavourable to
firm performance, as not all types of innovation positively influence firm performance.
Existing research in this regard remains unclear on the effects of intangibles and does not
provide a consensus on how to measure intellectual capital, given the decline in valuation
of intangibles following the global financial crisis. Evidence from studies such asHall and
Oriani (2006) andBloomandVanReenen (2010) shows that productivity differences have
been the focus of researchers for decades and, traditionally, those differences were
attributed to R&D investments. In other words, the residual in production that is not
accounted for by the usual inputs (such as labour, capital and intermediate inputs) is
assumed to be the product of R&D that produces technical change.1 For that reason, it is
vital to observe the impact of R&D on firm performance. On the other hand, Bloom and
VanReenen (2007, 2010) andBloom et al. (2012) argue that the literature fails to consider
the differences in managerial practices among firms that contribute to better firm
performance. In this paper, we try to integrate these two strands of literature, whilst also
considering the role of intangibles on firm performance in terms of profitability in the
pre-and post-crisis periods.
One strand advocates the idea that performance differences across firms are the
result of different management practices (see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010),
Bloom et al. (2012), Keller (2009, 2011)), while the second strand of literature centres
its arguments upon innovation activities by using R&D investment, R&D intensity and
related company intangibles as a proxy to explain differences in firm performance.
However, as the studies that focus on managerial practices do not consider innovative
activities such as R&D, patents, intangible assets, the R&D arguments (see studies
such as Hall (2010, 2011), Hall and Oriani (2006) and Hall et al. (2007, 2009, 2010
and 2013)) become important since R&D activities explain performance differences
across firms.
Another aspect emphasised by Hall (2010), Hall and Lerner (2010), Borisova and
Brown (2013) and Brown et al. (2012) relates to the role of financial constraints in R&D
activities by firms. The question then arises whether firms that are R&D and innovation-
based display differences in performance, after controlling for financial leverage. In
other words, we examine whether financial constraints impede innovation. Firms with
higher leverage ratios could have difficulties in financing innovation activities because
investors, banks or other finance providers usually seek tangible assets.When a company
does not have tangible assets, it is perceived as riskier, and investors are wary of
investing in them. Companies who are considered to be good performers are expected
to use their intangible assets (such as patents, brands, trademarks and trade secrets)
1According to Hall (2011), even though some of the ideas discussed were estimated in his
1973 survey, Griliches (1979) is the first and pioneering analytic survey on this topic. In that
article, Griliches laid out the structure of the problem in the production function context and
discussed two major measurement difficulties: the measurement of output when a great deal
of R&D is devoted to quality improvement and non-market goods, and the measurement of
input, specifically, of the stock of R&D capital. Also, Griliches (1998) summarises all his
writings on this topic.
and create tangibles out of them. Successful companies may have higher levels of
intangible assets, but they are successful due to their ability to turn those innovative
activities into assets. On the other hand, start-up companies may have good ideas, but if
those intangible efforts are not transformed into assets, they are perceived as non-
performers.
While the literature on managerial practices lacks a focus on R&D, intangibles
and firm financial constraints, the R&D-focused literature ignores differences in
managerial practices when comparing firm performance. Therefore, this paper
combines both aspects to examine differences in firm performance. Besides, there is a
gap in both strands of literature in examining what happens to R&D and innovative
activities during a crisis, and whether firms that are highly innovative and those that
are better managed outperform others during the post-crisis period. From the full
sample, we can see that the leverage ratios appear dispersed but they vary differently
during pre- and post-crisis periods. As shown in the descriptive statistics, firms’
leverage ratios were higher in the pre-crisis, but in the post-crisis period, leverage
started to decline. Moreover, previous literature has not explored whether these
differences (pre- and post-crisis) change the relationship between R&D, managerial
practices, and their impact on firm performance.
This paper uses UK firm-level data over the period 1992–2014 to investigate the
impact of managerial practices and innovation on firm’s profitability. The paper is
motivated by four key questions. The first one examines the impact of intangible assets
and R&D activity on firm performance. The second question examines whether better
managerial practices matter for firm performance. Additionally, the third question
elaborates how better managerial practices and innovation impact firms that are
financially constrained. Finally, the fourth question examines how managerial practices,
R&D activity and intangible assets have impacted performance before and following the
recent financial crisis. We find that intangible assets together with R&D activity have a
positive impact on firm performance, as firms with only higher levels of intangible assets
do not always benefit. Additionally, following the crisis, firms with high R&D activity
experienced a positive effect of intangibles on performance, as total assets became more
important in improving firm performance rather than intangibles that did not reflect their
true valuation in the pre-crisis period. This paper suggests that firms with better
managerial practices tend to outperform, even when we consider the impact of the
financial crisis, distinguishing firms with higher innovation activities and better
managerial practices. Finally, the paper finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between
intangible assets and firm performance. In the remainder of the paper, section 2 presents
the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 3 examines the data and
methodology, section 4 presents empirical results and the robustness checks. Finally,
section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Impact of intangible assets on firm performance
Various empirical studies show the impact of intangible assets on firm performance. The
best-documented and most widely researched area is research and development (R&D)
(see Marr et al. (2003, 2004)). The key approach in the majority of the early studies such
as Hall and Vopel (1997) and Hall et al. (2005, 2007) was to relate the market value of a
company to the value of its knowledge assets with indicators such as R&D and patent
citations, indicating a positive relationship. Lin et al. (2016) use R&D, intangible assets,
leverage and firm size as a benchmark, including R&D in five lags to show the dynamics
of R&D. They used Tobin’s Q as a firm performance measure, suggesting that
intangibles have a positive impact on firm performance, with leverage affecting firm
performance negatively.
According to Hall (2011), due to data availability, the most used measures of
innovative activities are patent counts and R&D spending. Hall et al. (2013) present an
analysis of a firm’s patenting decisions and its impact on performancemeasures. Some of
the variables that they analysed were product innovation, process innovation, formal IP
and informal IP2, and R&D per employee. The results suggest that among the firms
conducting R&Dor focusing on innovation, only 4% of them apply for patents. There are
four reasons for this: ‘If [the] innovation is process innovation [rather than product
innovation]’; ‘if this application or innovation is new to the company but not to the
market’; ‘if the [c]ost and (the time) and patent yield no additional benefits’; and that ‘[s]
ome innovations are inventions that are non-patentable’. These reasons foster the idea
that some parts of the intellectual properties of firms are embedded within managerial
practices instead of being formally protected. That also, to some extent, reflects the
argument of Bloom and Van Reenen on managerial practices and firm performance (see
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010), Bloom et al. (2012)).
As seen in the literature, intangibles are generally expected to have a positive impact
on firm performance. However, in this paper we suggest that intangible assets can have a
negative impact if the recent crisis period is considered when the valuation perception of
intangible assets changed. Before the recent financial crisis, intangibles were expected to
have a positive impact on firm performance, and following the crisis, this impact is
expected to become negative. The reason being that, in the pre-crisis period the greater
amount of intangible assets can be supportive for a companywhich does not have enough
tangible assets. So, even with lack of collateral and tangible assets, a higher amount of
intangible assets can cause those companies to get overvalued as happened before the
financial crisis. In the post-crisis period, investors became very cautious when a
company’s tangible assets became crucial in investment decisions rather than intangible
assets. Companies need tangible assets as collateral. Thus, it can be said that total assets
matter more after the crisis. Companies that had better performance before the crisis with
higher intangibles no longer benefit from those intangible assets. Therefore, they tend to
see a decline in their performance. That leads to Hypothesis 1.
H1: Intangible assets have a positive impact on firm performance before the crisis due
to the overvaluation of firms; and their effect is negative after the crisis due to the change
of valuation perception of intangible assets.
2.2. R&D and firm performance
The contribution of R&D to firm performance can be estimated by relating a
performance measure such as sales or profit to R&D expenditures in the current and
2Formal IPmeans the intangible assets that are legally protected by intellectual property such
as patents, trademarks or copyrights and informal IP is the one that is not legally protected.
previous periods to allow the delayed effect of R&D on business performance and by
controlling for the influence of other investments such as investment on physical assets.
Studies by Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Hall et al. (2005, 2007) analysed the effect of
R&D on the market value of companies and also returns to R&D.
O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009) analysed the relationship between R&D and
productivity by using Dynamic GMM estimation with data from five OECD countries
(US, UK, Japan, France and Germany). Their main contribution is that they integrated
standard analysis by using company accounts data with industrymeasures of knowledge-
generating factors such as R&D and human capital. To undertake this study at the
industry level, they introduced two taxonomies: factor intensity taxonomy and skill
intensive taxonomy. This provides an alternative to the traditional classification of high-
tech and low-tech industries. The results suggest that firmswithin an R&D/skill intensive
industry benefit from 2–5% higher productivity growth.
As we discussed earlier, according to Hall (2011), the most used measures of
innovative activities are patent counts and R&D spending. Hall (2011) argues that the
product innovation has a positive impact on revenue productivity, and the impact of
process innovation is less observable. We argue that the product and process innovation
distinction can be attributed to the fact that the less observable aspects of process
innovation can be dealt with by adding organisational capital into the analysis via
incorporating managerial practices. Parallel to the previous literature, the direct effect of
R&D on firm performance is expected to be positive in the overall sample. However, we
also examine the indirect effects of R&D activity on firm performance by using
interaction terms. R&D and non-R&D firms differ because R&D-based firms can
generate better performance from having intangible assets. The aim is to see whether
firms that invest heavily in R&D tend to have higher intangible assets and thus perform
better in terms of profitability.
Another dimension that is worth noting is the recent global financial crisis when firms
made substantial cuts in capital expenses to reduce their vulnerability. Therefore, it can
be suggested that firms which chose to maintain their R&D investment would benefit, or
at least, would be less prone to crisis. We perform an analysis before and following the
financial crisis to examine the relationship for the crisis period starting 2008 and also to
see how R&D-based firms are affected by the crisis in comparison to non-R&D and non-
intangible based firms. This aspect has not been addressed in the literature. We suggest
that the firms with higher R&D tend to benefit more from having higher intangibles,
captured by the interaction term of R&D and intangible assets. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H2: R&D investments have a positive influence on firm performance over the sample
period; and following the recent financial crisis, firms with greater investments in R&D
tend to benefit more from having higher intangible assets, thus they perform better.
2.3. The impact of organisational capital and managerial practices on firm
performance
Managerial practices play a significant role in firm-level performance and in explaining
productivity differences when measured across countries (Bloom and Reenen (2010),
Bloom et al. (2014)). Bloom and van Reenen (2010) extended their 2007 study by
including 16 countries, and concluded that the differences in productivity at the firm and
the national levels largely reflects variations in management practices. Bloom and Van
Reenen (2007) proposed 18 measures of managerial practices in a survey format, and
then analysed the impact of those managerial practices on firm performance in several
countries namely the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Camison and Villar-Lopez (2014) assessed the relationship between organisational
innovation and technological innovation capabilities, and analysed the effect on the
performance of 144 Spanish firms. The authors focused on the OECD’s definition of
organisational innovation (OI) which was as follows: ‘Organisational innovation is the
introduction of new organisational methods for business management in the workplace
and in the relationship between a company and external agents’ (OECD, 2005). As Mol
and Birkinshaw (2009) state, ‘The literature offers little evidence of the empirical
relationship between the introduction of new management practices and financial
performance’. Consequently, the debate on the impact of managerial practices on firm
performance is on-going, with one side maintaining that managerial practices have a
positive effect on firms as an indispensable source of competitive advantage (see
Armbruster et al. (2008), Mol and Birkinshaw (2009)). Furthermore, unlike previous
research, this study specifically considers how product and process intellectual capital
(IC) separately impact financial performance and how they correlate to achieve a positive
effect. Their argument is important as it provides a better understanding of how firms
benefit from these two types of technological IC. The results confirm that organisational
innovation favours the development of technological capabilities for products and
processes to provide better firm performance.
The effects of social, financial and human capital are valuable for firms. Doong et al.
(2011), Du et al. (2009) and Fung et al. (2007) argued that the traditional production
function of labour and capital omits the skilled human capital factor. Early studies show
that employees with economically valuable skills, experience and knowledge are
valuable to firms. An enterprise with extensive human capital can innovate more and
resolve customers’ problems more promptly, leading to better performance (see
Abeysekera and Guthrie (2004), Striukova et al. (2008)). A firm with more high-quality
human resources, which are not easily reproduced by competitors, can produce more
profit, competitive advantages, and core capabilities.
Doong et al. (2011) investigate the impact of social capital, financial capital and
human capital on firm performance. They define social capital as total lending and
borrowing among related-party transactions and find a positive effect on firm value.
Based on the relationships outside of, and within the firm, they compute the total amount
of intangible assets and goodwill as a ratio of assets for firm-related activities for social
capital. For human capital, they add R&D, education and other variables, such as product
and process development, which also have positive and significant effects on financial
performance. Our analysis is similar in the sense that we include intangibles and R&D in
our analyses. However, in our paper, we address product and process development and
human capital elements within the index for managerial practices. A detailed explanation
of the construction of the managerial practices variable will be discussed in the data
description section.
Matemilola et al. (2013) include managerial skill factors in their analysis showing that
leverage and managerial skills have a positive relationship with the return. They develop
a measure of managerial skills and use the management literature to explain how
managerial skills impact shareholders’ return. Matemilola et al. (2013) investigate
whether managerial practices and financial leverage have an impact on investors’ return.
Before the financial crisis, firms’ leverage ratios were very high. Similarly, it is also
observed in our dataset that if a pre-crisis period is considered, leverage ratios are
substantially high. The global increase in risk premiumand shareholders’ return during the
recent financial crisis is partly attributed to the use of excessive leverage by top
management. Since the use of high leverage increasesfinancial risk, shareholders’ demand
a higher return to compensate them for the added financial risk. Nonetheless, managerial
skill has frequently been omitted because its measurement is relatively less
straightforward, and failure to account for unobservable firm-specific factors in a return
model leads to omitted variable bias. Specifically, the role of unobservable firm-specific
factors such as managerial skills has been ignored in the literature, but managerial skills
could have a strong influence on shareholder return. Crummenerl et al. (2015) also looked
at the subject frommanagers’ perspective and investigated the decisions of managers and
their optimal stock-based compensation from the perspective of shareholder value.
Furthermore, the results of Archibugi et al. (2013) are similar to the previous
literature, in that size, economic performance, and an exploitation strategy predict
increased innovation investment before the crisis. Strategy performs a central role in the
understanding of intellectual capital, allowing a complete and critical interpretation of
intangible assets. For instance, earlier studies such as Edvinsson and Sullivan (1996) and
Edvinsson (1997) categorise ‘strategy’within the organisational capital, whereas Bontis
(1998) focuses on managing intellectual capital strategically and uses the term ‘strategic
innovation’. Garcıa-meca et al. (2005) and Garcıa-Meca and Martınez (2007) use
strategy as an IC (intellectual capital) element in their study. Kaplan and Norton (1996,
2001, 2004) place ‘the strategy’ in the centre of their Balance Scorecard.3 Verschoor
(1999) finds a positive relationship between a strong ethical commitment (which
becomes a key part of firms’ strategies in the current decade) and firm performance.
Some authors argue the corporate social responsibility to be positively related to a firm’s
profitability (Stanwick and Stanwick (1998), Simpson and Kohers (2002)). Hillman and
Keim (2001) note that the shareholder value increases when a firm invests in socially
responsible activities. More recently, Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) investigate
the impact of socially responsible firms in terms of the environment, sustainability and
governance on the financial performance of funds. We also adopt a similar approach in
order to incorporate the environment, sustainability and governance indicators for
calculation of ourmanagerial practices variable. Based on a sample of French SRI Funds,
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) find non-linear evidence that a greater screening
intensity slightly reduces financial performance, and this moves in the opposite direction
when screening gets tougher. Additionally, Garcıa-Meca and Martınez (2007) use five
classifications for IC: Human Capital; Customers; Organizational Innovation; Research
3Kaplan and Norton’s Balance Scorecard (1992,1996) where firm’s strategy and vision is in
the centre of the model and four perspectives  Financial perspective, Internal Business
Process perspective, Customer perspective, Learning & Growth perspective  that firms
should look to ensure firm’s vision and strategy, can be provided as one of the key studies in
the area of firms’ organisational practice. A company can monitor short-term results from the
customers, internal business processes, and learning and growth perspectives and evaluate
strategy in the light of recent performance. The scorecard thus enables companies to modify
strategies to reflect real-time learning.
and Development; and Strategy. Our hypothesis is parallel with Garcıa-Meca and
Martınez’s classification. They include the variable for strategy  a firm’s most critical
process to create IC and thus firm value.
To sum up, we argue that the better managed firms tend to have better financial
performance and that is where our study diverges from the traditional R&D literature and
aims to contribute. In this paper, we include managerial practices of each firm, leading to
the next hypothesis.
H3: Better managerial practices have a positive impact on firm performance.
2.4. Impact of financial constraints and the recent financial crisis on R&Ddecisions and
firm performance
The literature often has contrasting views on whether financial constraints impede
innovation and firm performance. Some scholars argue that innovation activities are
curtailed during bad times, and when a firm has a higher leverage ratio, it uses borrowing
to expand or sustain business activities. When a firm has a high leverage ratio, the first
decision the management team takes is to cut extra costs. As R&D activities are
considered as an expense, R&D investment can be the first thing to be reduced. Some
scholars find that firms prefer to maintain R&D activities in bad times because they were
locked into these activities due to an initial investment (see Archibugi et al., 2013).
Lin et al. (2016) use financial constraint in their analysis as an explanatory variable in
their estimation and find a negative relationship with firm performance (also see Mallick
and Yang, (2011)). Additionally, Lin et al. include intangible assets, goodwill and
research and development to capture innovative activities. On the other hand, there are
various studies on financial constraints, suggesting that financially constrained firms tend
to invest in R&D due to being locked in to R&D activities as a result of previous
commitments and agreements (see Archibugi et al. (2013)). In addition, Li (2011)
provides new perspectives by investigating these aspects via the interaction between
financial constraints and R&D investment. As opposed to capital investment, R&D
investment is inflexible. A financially constrained R&D-intensive firm is more likely to
withdraw its R&D projects. Therefore, the risk for the R&D-intensive firms increases
with their financial constraints position and vice versa, meaning that financially
constrained firms’ risks increase with the growth of their R&D intensity. The relationship
of financial limits and return are more robust in R&D-intensive firms and are positive
only among financially constrained firms. These findings suggest that financial
constraints have a significant impact on the risk and return of R&D-intensive firms and
potentially drive the positive R&D-return relationship. So, with the above evidence, it
can be said that the literature on the relationship between financial constraints and stock
returns suggests mixed evidence. To capture this, we investigate the joint impact of
financial leverage with R&D and managerial practices via adding interactions, as this
aspect has not been investigated in previous studies.
There is a strong positive link between cash inflows and corporate R&D investment,
but only among firms that are most likely facing binding financing constraints, as
supported by evidence in Borisova and Brown (2013). The evidence that financing
frictions impact the increasingly important, yet understudied, intangible corporate
investments can drive innovative activity. Sales have a positive impact on R&D
spending in constrained firms, as they use their sales revenue to finance R&D activities
rather than to increase their leverage. Overall, evidence supports that financing frictions
have economically significant effects on major corporate investment decisions. The
study of Borisova and Brown (2013) is one of the few studies to test for financing
constraints on intangible corporate investment activities. Although fixed investment has
received much more attention, there are several reasons to expect that intangible
investments like R&D were particularly sensitive to financing difficulties due to
information asymmetries and limited collateral value. However, according to Hall and
Lerner (2010), prior studies that examine R&D offer mixed and inconclusive evidence,
and they show that financing frictions influence firm-level R&D.
The results of Borisova and Brown (2013) clearly indicate that financing constraints
impact R&D investment in smaller, younger and low pay-out firms. R&D is an
increasingly critical decision and a key input for innovation and productivity growth in
modern economies. The results indicate that financial market developments that ease
financing constraints increase R&D investment in growing firms, which in turn, should
incentivise innovation and lead to higher overall economic growth.4
Several studies advance a ‘financing hypothesis’ to explain corporate divestitures, but
this literature has not considered whether firms use asset sale proceeds to support
intangible investments that are particularly sensitive to funding difficulties. The use of
cash inflows from asset sales for intangible investment can be valuable because asset
sales tend to be negatively correlated with other financing sources. This suggests that a
fixed asset may be especially valuable to innovative firms during recessions and other
periods when liquidity concerns are particularly pronounced. Borisova and Brown
(2013) show that funds from the sale of fixed assets can support a key intangible
investment in firms facing binding financing constraints. R&D investment by its nature is
intangible, as it does not fulfill the criteria of collateral. Judge (2006) assesses disclosures
in the annual reports of 400 UK companies with data collected via a survey, and finds
unlike many previous US studies strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the
expected costs of financial distress. Additionally, Cosci et al. (2015) find that firms with
credit constraints may choose to lease instead of borrowing from a bank for buying the
fixed assets and therefore they will be able to allocate more resources to their projects
which require investment. They used total company assets, firm size and other firm-
specific variables and find a negative relationship with credit constraints. Xu et al. (2013)
analyse the Chinese listed firms with credit constraints and interestingly find that firms
that face under-investment problems can mitigate this issue if the firm has stronger
political connections; the mitigation effect was found to be even stronger in financially
more constrained firms.
4Their findings also suggest that public policy efforts to foster financial market access by
liberalising capital markets and providing stronger legal protections for outside suppliers of
capital can have an especially pronounced effect on innovation and intangible investment. In
addition, their findings suggest policies that increase the funds available for intangible
investment  such as lower effective corporate tax rates for R&D intensive firms or
government loan guarantees to finance innovative projects can be growth-enhancing. Such
efforts could be especially important for countries with less developed capital markets where
financing constraints on R&D are likely to be especially severe.
Brown et al. (2012) study a large sample of European firms and also find little
evidence of binding financing constraints when estimating standard investment-cash
flow regressions. However, they find substantial evidence that the availability of
finance matters for R&D, controlling for firm efforts to smooth R&D with cash
reserves and a firm’s use of external equity finance. Brown et al. (2012) also evaluate
the impact of financing constraints when firms rely extensively on external funding
and endogenously manage cash flows. Results indicate an important role for external
equity in financing R&D and promoting firm-level innovative activity. An important
aspect of R&D is the susceptibility to financing constraints. For several reasons,
including lack of collateral value and asymmetric information problems, R&D may
face significant adverse selection and moral hazard problems, particularly in younger
and smaller firms. For such firms, financing constraints can drive R&D investment
below the privately optimal level in a world of no financing frictions. If funding
constraints are binding for many firms, national and global R&D levels will be
depressed, leading to lower levels of innovation and growth than in a world without
financing frictions.
Despite R&D’s critical role in economic growth and its susceptibility to financing
difficulties, relatively few studies evaluate how financing frictions affect R&D, and the
results of these studies are mixed. Furthermore, evidence supporting economically vital
funding constraints on R&D is much stronger for US firms compared to European firms,
which is puzzling, as capital markets in the US are at least as developed as those in
Europe. For example, recent studies by Brown et al. (2009) and Brown and Petersen
(2009) find a strong link between R&Dand internal and external equity finance for young
publicly-traded US firms. On the other hand, Bond and Van Reenen (2003) find that
neither German firms nor UK firms display a correlation between the level of R&D and
cash flow. Hall and Lerner (2010) provide a comprehensive summary of the literature
and conclude that it remains an open question whether financing constraints matter
for R&D.
According to Brown et al. (2012), determining whether financing constraints matter
for R&D is important for identifying the causal connections between finance and
economic growth. Yet, prior studies focusing on European firms tend to find weak
evidence (at most) that financing constraints have a quantitatively important impact on
R&D. Utilising a broad sample of European enterprises, Brown et al. (2012) find little or
no evidence that finance matters for R&D if only the R&D-cash flow sensitivity is
examined, consistent with the approach in nearly all studies of financing R&D.
However, findings of Brown et al. (2012) show that access to internal and external
equity finance matters a great deal for R&D, particularly in firms most likely to face
binding financing constraints. The main reason for this reversal of results appears to be
that firms facing financing frictions have strong incentives to build and utilise costly
stocks of liquidity to keep the flow of R&D spending relatively smooth compared to
transitory finance shocks, avoiding massive adjustment costs associated with R&D.
Their results also indicate that better access to equity financing can substantially
increase R&D investment, which has long been a key public policy goal in the EU and
many other countries. Brown et al. (2012) show that stock markets are much more
than a ‘sideshow’ when it comes to financing R&D. That helps explain the very high
R&D-intensities of young publicly traded firms in countries such as the UK and
Sweden.
Because this paper is based on the analysis of firm performance at the micro level,
another question is to what extent financing of innovative firms is different from other
firms. According to Hall (2010), owing to the intangible nature of their investment,
asymmetric information and moral hazard, these firms are more likely to be financed by
equity than debt, especially if they are small. Hall points out differences between the US
and the UK on the one hand, and continental European countries on the other, in
estimates of the cash-flow sensitivity for established firms. The former is more sensitive
than the latter; so, in principle, the US and UK firms should be more subject to financing
constraints. However, there is little evidence that this leads to less innovative activity.
The largest of these firms in all countries and the ones that undertake the greatest amount
of R&D, tend to compete in international markets; so, it is not likely that the behaviour of
firms from different countries can diverge too far. Some policy implications can be
derived from the results of Hall (2010).5
Early studies by Hall (2002), Hall et al. (2009) and Hall and Lerner (2010) agree that
although leverage may seem a useful tool for reducing agency costs in the firm, it is of
limited value for R&D-intensive firms. Because knowledge assets that are created within
the firm by R&D investments are intangible and embedded in human capital and
managerial practices, the capital structure of R&D-intensive firms customarily exhibits
less leverage than others. Banks and other debt holders prefer to use physical assets to
secure loans and are reluctant to lend for projects that involve substantial R&D
investment rather than plant and equipment.
To sum up, financial constraints impact the decision of innovative activities. More
importantly, during times of financial crisis, more constraints are added, and
innovative activities are affected even more. One of the best explanations for the
differences in arguments regarding the behaviour of financially constrained firms was
presented by Filippetti and Archibugi (2011), Archibugi and Filippetti (2011) and
Archibugi et al. (2013). Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) investigate the impact of the
current economic downturn on innovation across Europe using micro-level and
macro-level data. Evidence suggests that while some firms exhibit persistence in
investing in innovation during recessions, others do not. This persistence can be a
result of several factors including firm-specific characteristics  such as strategies,
managerial differences, stage of development, advertisement profits  and
technological changes, scientific research and the nature of innovation. Firms across
Europe that performed well in these factors were found to be able to offset the effect of
the economic downturn on innovation investments.
Archibugi et al. (2012, 2013) find that size, economic performance, and an
exploitation strategy predicted increased innovation investment before the crisis.
However, during the crisis, they found interesting differences. Both size and economic
performance played a less important role. By contrast, the presence of in-house R&D
activity became a major predictor of increases in innovation expenditure during the
crisis. As for the firm’s strategy, pursuing an explorative strategy (including considering
new markets), became relatively more important. This evidence suggests that there are
5This paper was published as: Hall, B., ‘The financing of innovative firms’, European
Investment Bank Papers, Vol. 14, 2009, pp. 8–28. It was then reprinted in the Review of
Economics and Institutions and the recommended citation is Hall, B. (2010), ‘The Financing
of Innovative Firms’, Review of Economics and Institutions, 1 (1), Article 4.
two sources that can create persistence in innovation in a crisis period. First, the existence
of an R&D department suggests the firm has made a medium or long-term commitment
to innovation. Secondly, the contribution of R&D into a firm’s strategy is vital, if the
strategy is based on exploration of new markets and development of new products.
According to the results of Archibugi et al. (2012, 2013), the 2008 economic crisis has
severely reduced the short-term willingness of firms to invest in innovation. However,
this reduction has not occurred uniformly, and a few firms even increased their
investment, despite the adverse macroeconomic environment. When the drivers of
innovation investment before and during the crisis were examined, it was found that the
crisis led to a concentration of innovative activities within a small group of fast-growing
new firms and those firms were already highly innovative before the crisis. Companies
pursuing more explorative strategies towards new product and market developments are
better able to cope with the crisis.
After an extensive review of the literature on leverage and financial constraints, we
find that the direct and indirect effects of leverage can be different during the pre- and
post-crisis periods. In this paper, we aim to address that by dividing our sample into pre-
and post-crisis and by incorporating the joint impact of R&D with intangibles and
managerial practices into our analyses. By doing this, we suggest that the impact of
leverage on firm performance will vary if the firms have better managerial practices,
higher intangible assets and higher R&D ratios. Therefore, the next hypothesis can be
structured as follows:
H4: The direct impact of leverage tends to be negative on a firm’s performance, both
before and during crisis; while the indirect impact of leverage will be positive for the
firms with intangibles, more R&D investment, and better managerial practices.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data description
This paper investigates the impact of R&D activities and managerial practices on firm
performance using firm-level data from the UK (i.e., FTSEALLSHARE) over the period
1992–2014. Firm performance is examined in terms of profitability and we use profit
margins as dependent variable in our analyses, denoted as ‘PM’. Profit margins can be
calculated as total profit over total sales. Baseline estimations are done by using OLS
with time and firm fixed effects, and further estimations are done using Dynamic GMM.
Besides, marginal effects analysis is conducted to elaborate the joint impact of R&D
intensity, managerial practices and intangible assets further.
The data are collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream. Our analysis started with
FTSE100 companies and then, to improve our analysis further, we expanded the
dataset to FTSEALLSHARE. However, we have data limitations due to missing
observations, resulting in fewer firms and lowering the number of observations in our
sample. Table 1a lists the names and a short description of the variables used in the
analysis. Each variable is taken as a ratio of sales to overcome the scaling problem.
For that reason, each variable is divided by sales. Additionally, each variable is
represented on a logarithmic scale.
Intangible Ratio is the amount of intangible assets over sales and is calculated as the
amount of Intangible Assets in £ millions divided by Total Sales in £ millions and
denoted as ‘Int’. Instead of R&D investment as an expense, we are interested in R&D
intensity, which shows the contribution of R&D per unit of output: R&D is calculated by
the total amount of investment towards R&D, divided by total sales in £ millions.
Another variable is Total Asset ratio which is calculated as Total Assets to Sales ratio,
and can also be called Total Assets Turnover. That compares assets relative to the amount
of sales that a company can generate using their assets. Total assets to Total Sales ratio is
a measure of a company’s efficiency in managing its assets in relation to the revenue
generated. When this ratio is higher, it indicates the required investment is smaller. It is
denoted as ‘TotA’. Sources of the variables denoting Intangible Assets, Total Assets and
Total Sales are explained in Table 1b below in detail.
The question that motivates the choice of explanatory variables is whether besides
the traditional form of innovation (i.e., R&D activities), modern innovative practices
such as improving managerial practices drive company performance and whether this
relationship is influenced by financial crisis or high leverage. In fact, instead of
focusing only on R&D for measuring firm productivity, managerial practices are
integrated to solve firm performance-innovation puzzle. Human and organisational
capital can be considered as the main attributes of managerial practices. Therefore, we
used data addressing those attributes. For further details regarding the data sources and
explanations, please see Table 1b below. The Managerial Practice variable is based on
score variables on a scale of 0–100 for each firm and denoted as ‘MngPrc’. This
dataset is from a survey called ASSET4, which is obtained from Thomson Reuters
DataStream. The variable is a score-based system that attributes scores between 0–100
in each period across firms. We have six different measures which we use in building
up the Managerial Practice variable (listed in Table 1c). To form our measure, we sum
all these variables which makes our maximum score 600 and minimum score 0.
Following that, we then construct our managerial practice variable by dividing the
scores by the total sales of each firm within a particular time period. It can be justified
that Managerial Practices over Sales indicate managerial practices per unit of output.
Firms are not identical in size. Some firms are larger while some are smaller. Those
Table 1a
Descriptions of variables
This table describes the variables. All variables are represented as a ratio of sales and are in logarithms.
Variable Description
PM Net Profit Margin (Net Profit /Sales)
Int Intangible ratio (Total Intangible Assets/Total Sales)
R&D R&D intensity
Mngprc Managerial Practices
DtoC Leverage ratio: (Total Debt/Total Capital)
TotA Total Assets ratio (Total Assets/Total Sales)
int_sq Squared Intangible Assets
mngprc_sq Squared Managerial Practices
TotA_sq Squared Total Assets
Table 1b
Data description
This table shows the data code and DataStream source for Intangible Assets, Total Assets and Total
Salesdata, alongwith a description. Then these three variables are used to construct ‘Intangible to Sales’
and ‘Total Asset to Sales’ ratios which were described previously in Table 1a.
Data








It represents other assets not having a
physical existence. The value of these





Total Assets All Industries: Total assets in this
category represent the sum of total
current assets, long-term receivables,
investment in unconsolidated
subsidiaries, other investments, net
property, plant and equipment and
other assets.
Banks: Total assets here represent the
sum of cash and due from banks, total
investments, net loans, customer
liability on acceptances (if included in
total assets), investment in
unconsolidated subsidiaries, real
estate assets, net property, plant &
equipment and other assets.
Insurance Companies: Total assets




property, plant & equipment and other
assets.
Other Financial Companies: Total
assets here represent the sum of cash
& equivalents, receivables, securities
inventory, custody securities, total
investments, net loans, net property,
plant and equipment, investments in




Net Sales Net sales represent gross sales and other
operating revenue less discounts,
returns and allowances. Franchise
sales when corresponding costs are










Research and development expense
represents all direct and indirect costs
related to the creation and
development of new processes,
techniques, applications and products
with commercial possibilities. These
costs can be categorised as 1. Basic
research 2. Applied research 3.





(Ratio %). (DWNP / DWSL) Net profit
is divided by net sales (unavailable
before 1998). DWNM represented by






Leverage ratio of the company. It is
calculated by: (Long Term Debt þ
Short Term Debt & Current Portion of
Long Term Debt) / (Total Capital þ
Short Term Debt & Current Portion of
Long Term Debt)  100
Notes:
1) ‘Total Intangible Assets’ includes but is not restricted to: Goodwill, patents, copyrights, trademarks, formulae,
franchises of no specific duration, capitalised software development costs/computer programs, organisational costs,
customer lists, licences of no specific duration, capitalised advertising cost, mastheads (newspapers), capitalised
servicing rights, purchased servicing rights.
2) ‘Total Assets’ excludes contra items (contingent liabilities), it is adjusted to exclude deferred taxes, includes
trust business assets. It is adjusted to exclude foreign currency translation gains/losses, to exclude provision for
bad debt/loan losses, to exclude treasury stock, to exclude investment in own bonds, to exclude foreign currency
translation losses and provision for bad debts, to excluded treasury stock and investment in own bonds, to
excluded unappropriated net loss; increased by payments on work in progress that has been treated as a current
liability.
3) ‘Total Sales’ includes but is not restricted to: Consulting fees, service income, royalty income when
included in revenues by the company, contracts-in-progress income, licensing and franchise fees, income
derived from equipment lease or rental when considered part of operating revenue, commissions earned (not
gross billings) for advertising companies, income from leased departments. It excludes: Non-operating
income, interest income, interest capitalized, equity in earnings of unconsolidated subsidiaries, rental income,
dividend income, foreign exchange adjustment, gain on debt retired, sale of land or natural resources, sale of
plant and equipment, sale of investment, sales from discontinued operations, security transactions, income on
reserve fund securities when shown separately, operating differential subsidies for shipping companies, net
mutual aid assistance for airlines companies, general and service taxes, value-added taxes, excise taxes,
windfall profit taxes.
4) ‘Research & Development’ includes but is not restricted to: Software expense, design and development
expense, engineering expense; contributions from government, customers, partnerships or other corporations,
science or technology expense, includes market testing & research, exploration expense. It excludes customer
or government sponsored research amortisation, for oil, gas, coal, drilling and mining companies, and
purchase of mineral rights. It excludes cost of plant R&D, contributions by government, customers,




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































differences in firm sizes may cause biases in examining the value of managerial
scores, as a considerably smaller firm might have the same level of managerial
practices as a larger firm due to its small size. Therefore, we are looking for the quality
of managerial practices per unit of output. This consideration will eliminate potential
bias.
Alternatively, bias related to firm size could be dealt with by using total assets
instead of total sales. However, this would be an inaccurate method for our
estimations, because the amount of intangible assets is used as an explanatory
variable, and it would cause a multi-collinearity problem if intangible assets and total
assets were used in the same regression because total assets cover tangible plus
intangible assets. Here, the idea behind using ratios of sales is that sales will capture
the activity type within a firm. The bigger activity could be a sign of bigger firms;
those firms produce more and they will be more complex regarding their managerial
structures. Therefore, it will reveal whether firms can improve managerial practice if
they are producing more. The impact of intangibles, managerial practices and R&D
investments on firm performance is plotted as scatterplots in Figure 1 below. The
results suggest that when R&D investments increase, firm performance increases as
well. The same relationship holds for intangible assets and managerial practices. We
test whether the data satisfy normality and we plot histograms before and after the
crisis and for the whole sample (see Figure 2). Figure 2 shows that before the crisis,
the performance of intangibles was higher. Therefore, the before crisis graph is
skewed to the right, while the after-crisis graph is more skewed to the left. We see that
after the crisis, firms’ intangible performances were reduced. That is why our after-
crisis curve becomes left skewed.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2, and the correlation matrix is shown in
Table 3. Table 2 constructs a classification of firms as: high managerial-practice
intensive and low managerial-practice intensive, and also describes the data for the pre-
crisis, post-crisis and overall sample. Also, in Table 2, the summary of the elements
constructing managerial practices is presented for both pre- and post-crisis, as well as
low and high managerial practice intensive firm categories. Low managerial practice
intensive firms have managerial practices values below mean, while high managerial
practice intensive firms take values above the mean.
In Table 3, correlation matrix has been constructed with significance levels reported
with ‘’, and all of them are significant at least at the 10% significance level. That means
the results of the correlation matrix indicate weak correlations between variables which
are robust at the 10% level at least. There is a low correlation among the covariates and
significant correlation between dependent variable and explanatory variables.
3.2. Methodology
Baseline regressions are conducted by using the OLS estimation method by adding time
and firm fixed effects. The Haussmann test and Lagrange Multiplier tests have been
conducted to choose between FE, RE andOLS. However, the panel data have a long-time
period, and the FE andDynamic FE do not give robust results, both theoretically from the
test results, and practically, from the insignificance of the coefficients of regression 
which has not been reported here for brevity. Typically, in a panel dataset, the
unobserved heterogeneity could be dealt with by first difference or individual fixed
effects transformations.
Given that our estimates could be subject to endogeneity bias, we use the Dynamic
SystemGMM approach, where lagged levels are used as instruments for the equations in
first differences, and lagged first differences are used as instruments for the equations in
levels. In this case, System GMM tends to give more robust results in the context of
production function estimation than Difference GMM (Blundell and Bond (2000)). In
our estimations, GMM instruments are drawn from lagged and differenced variables for
yi;t1 and yi;t2 and the data are transformed by differencing as Dyi;t1; Dyi;t2. In our
estimations, these were created by lagged variables.
Some diagnostic tests are conducted to ensure the validity of Dynamic GMM
estimates. The Sargan test, the Arellano-Bond test and the Wald test are used. For a
valid instrument set, the orthogonality between the instrument and the error term is
tested using the Sargan test of over identifying restrictions. This test can be applied in
the case where more than one instrumental variable is available for each endogenous
variable. Under the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are valid, the
Sargan test is distributed as a Chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of over identifying restrictions. Sargan test results suggest that the instruments
are valid.
Fig. 1. Scatter plots
Each figure represents the relationship between an explanatory variable and the dependent variable 
profit margin. Fitted values are shown within 95% confidence intervals. The figure suggests that higher
R&D intensity, intangibles, managerial practices and total assets increase profit margin, while higher
leverage increases profit margin initially and then reduces it.
We conducted the Arellano-Bond test that was developed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) to test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term. The instrument
set is restricted to 3 lags, as in all of the models only order-1 serial correlation (AR (1)) is
found. The test for AR (1) and AR (2) validates the existence of first order
autocorrelation. A longer set of lags would be needed if the order-2 serial correlation was
observed, which is not found in our estimated models. Because we have only level 1
serial correlation and we test AR (1) and AR (2), we limited our maximum lagged
variables to be instrumented to lag 3.
The Wald test works by testing the null hypothesis that the two coefficients of interest
are simultaneously equal to zero. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the
coefficients are not simultaneously equal to zero. The result indicates that the model and
selected variables are valid.
4. Empirical Results
As our primary empirical analysis, we estimate the impact of R&D investments,
intangible assets and managerial practices on firm performance using net profit margin
Fig. 2. Histograms
These figures represent the distribution of the data and plot histograms for all the variables in pre- &
post-crisis periods and in overall sample. From these figures, it is seen that standard deviation of post
crisis profit margins increases showing a higher volatility of profit margins across all firms in the after-
crisis sample. The same is also true for the leverage and R&D intensity as these two are both highly
volatile. However interestingly, the volatility of total assets declines post-crisis, unlike the intangibles























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as a performance measure. The results are reported in Table 4. All the variables are
used in a logarithmic scale, to prevent scaling differences in our estimation and to
provide consistency in units. Additionally, all the variables are represented as a ratio
of sales to observe the impact of the variable on firm performance for each additional
unit of output. To keep our results consistent, we used these representations
throughout all the tables. The results from Table 4 suggest that incorporating time and
company fixed effects along with the first lag of profit margin does not give very
robust results. This is due to the potential endogeneity and heterogeneity in our dataset
which is addressed by using Dynamic System GMM in the rest of the tables. Our
benchmark estimations are conducted using Dynamic GMM estimates, and the results
are shown in Table 5a. The model we estimate is given in equation (1). The result that
can be inferred is that neither solely intangible assets nor managerial practices alone
are enough for optimal firm performance. Therefore, the firm performance can be
improved only if those two are combined within a firm. Equation (1) is based on model
(8) from Table 5a:
PMi;t ¼ b0 þ b1PMi;t1  b2ðIntÞi;t þ b3logR&Di;t þ b5ðMngprcÞi;t
þb4ðIntÞi;t  R&Di;t þ b5ðMngPrcÞi;t  logR&Di;t
 b6ðMngPrcÞi;t  ðIntÞi;t  b7ðDtoCÞi;t þ ei;t ð1Þ
where,
i: denotes each company listed in FTSE; t: time periods;
PMi;t: Profit margin of company i in time t (our dependent variable);
PMi;t1: Profit margin of company i in time t–1 (lagged dependent variable);
Intð Þi;t: Intangible ratio of company i in time t;
logR&Di;t: R&D intensity of company i in time t;
Mngprcð Þi;t: Managerial practices of company i in time t;
DtoCð Þi;t: Leverage ratio of company i in time t.
Throughout the estimations in the Table 5a, R&D is positive. However, intangible
assets appear to be negative, which may seem unexpected. To analyse further, we
introduce interaction terms that will help us understand the complex relationship of
R&D, managerial practices, and intangibles in the model. Furthermore, there is an
optimal level of the joint impact of intangibles and R&D or intangibles and managerial
practices for each company, beyond which firm performance can decline because any
additional R&D spending can become sunk cost.
4.1. Marginal effects
After the OLS estimations in Table 4, in Table 5a we present the benchmark model
using Dynamic System GMM regression to overcome the endogeneity problems.
Following the estimations in Table 5a model (8) in column (8), we then estimated the
marginal effects shown in Figure 3. The estimation of marginal effects on profit
margins is carried out at different percentiles (10th, 25th, mean, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th
and 99th). Marginal effects estimations assist us in determining at what level, profit
margin is affected, and we check whether the interactions are correctly specified and
justify the marginal effects of R&D, intangibles and managerial practice on firm










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































assets at different levels of R&D, the marginal effects of R&D intensity at different
levels of intangible assets, the marginal effects of intangibles at different levels of
managerial practices, and the marginal effects of managerial practices at different
levels of intangible assets.
First, in Figure 3 (Panel A), we show the marginal effect of intangible assets on
firm performance at different levels of R&D to justify the significance and direction
of the joint relationship between R&D and intangibles and whether this interaction
has an impact on profit margins. It is observed that marginal effects of intangible
assets are higher at a higher percentile of R&D. Clearly, the figure shows that
companies with R&D intensity at higher percentiles benefit more from intangible
assets in achieving better firm performance. An increasing pattern is observed with a
significant positive coefficient of the interaction term of R&D and intangible assets;
the joint impact of those two positively influences firm performance. The intangible
assets have a higher impact on profitability with higher levels of R&D. Furthermore,
we also investigated the marginal effects of R&D on profit margins at different
levels of intangible assets and found a declining pattern, reported in Panel B. This
indicates that the marginal effects of R&D on profit margins decline but remain
positive with higher levels of intangible assets. This can be due to the direct negative
Fig. 3. Marginal effects
The figures show the marginal effects plots based on marginal effect estimations from Table 5a.
impact of intangibles on profit margins during the pre-crisis period which dominates
the whole sample.
Also, we investigate the marginal effect of intangibles on firm performance
at different levels of managerial practices shown in Panel C of Figure 3. It is
observed that marginal effects of intangible assets are higher with higher levels of
managerial practices, meaning that the impact of intangible assets is greater when
the company has better managerial practices. Furthermore, we also examined the
marginal effects of managerial practices on profit margins at different levels of
intangibles in Panel D showing a declining pattern, which suggests that the marginal
effects of managerial practices on profit margin decline with higher levels of
intangible assets. The interaction term from this estimation is negative and
significant throughout, justifying the opposite relationship between managerial
practices and intangibles.
4.2. U-test and the application of Schumpeterian Theory of Innovation: Creative
destruction and creative accumulation
According to Schumpeter (1942), innovation results in creative destruction, or the
situation when the recent innovation replaces or destroys previous innovation, showing
an inverse U-shaped relationship . As stated by Gallini (1992), Horowitz and Lai (1996)
and later shown by Qian (2007), innovation has an ‘inverted U-shaped curve’, meaning
that there is an optimal level of innovation above which further patent protection actually
has an adverse effect on innovation.
By examining the relationships between indicators of Schumpeterian patterns of
innovation and indicators of the variables defining technological regimes
empirically, Breschi et al. (2000) suggest that different technological regimes
lead the industry to two patterns of innovations in Schumpeterian thought. The first
pattern is where deepening, or creative accumulation takes place, where innovator
firms continue to innovate and accumulate knowledge. The second pattern is creative
destruction where innovations are made by innovators that did not innovate before,
causing widening. The two patterns are best explained by the suitability of
conditions and technological opportunities available plus the existence of relevant
knowledge base in the industry. It has been shown by Breschi et al. (2000) that fewer
technological opportunities, better suitability of conditions and more cumulative
knowledge carry a system towards (deepening) creative accumulation pattern.
However, more technological opportunities, suitable conditions, and a relevant
knowledge base will move towards a (widening) creative destruction pattern.
According to Gilbert (2006), ‘the incentive to innovate is the difference in profit that
a firm can earn if it invests in research and development compared to what it would
earn if it did not invest’. Differences in market structure, the characteristics of
innovations, the feature discovery, and whether exclusive or non-exclusive rights
protect the innovations, can impact the innovation–firm performance relationship. In
fact, whether a new technology can be sold or licensed is usually determined by
exclusive rights, such as patents. Those rights allow for independent invention and the
ability to adapt new processes ahead of rivals. Consequently, an increase in the
number of competing firms decreases the value of each discovery, because the use of a
‘new technology’ by many firms reduces each firm’s stake in the entire output created
by that new technology. So, in general, Gilbert’s suggestions are consistent with
Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’ that accepts monopolies as temporary
and new competition can arise.
Following the regressions in Table 5b, we conducted a U-test for our main
explanatory variables: managerial practices, intangibles and R&D intensity reported
in Table 5c. The test results suggest that intangible assets and managerial practices
have inverse U shapes, while R&D intensity is not U-shaped or inverse U-shaped.
Then, throughout the estimations, we added squared terms of intangibles and
managerial practices. The results also support our hypotheses for intangible assets
before and after a crisis. The interpretation of the inverse U-shape relationship in
intangible assets is that there is a threshold for intangible assets. Up to certain level,
intangibles have a positive impact on firm performance, meaning that each
additional unit of intangibles has a positive contribution to firm performance.
However, beyond that threshold, the effect tends to decline. That is also true for
managerial practices. Indeed, this result is consistent with the Schumpeterian theory
of creative destruction discussed above. In addition to the models in Table 5a, we
added a squared term of intangibles and squared term of managerial practices in
model (10) of Table 5b. The model we obtained is shown in equation (2).
PMi;t ¼ b0 þ b1PMi;t1  b2ðIntÞi;t þ b3logR&Di;t þ b5ðMngprcÞi;t
þb4ðIntÞi;t  R&Di;t þ b5ðMngPrcÞi;t  logR&Di;t  b6ðMngPrcÞi;t  ðIntÞi;t
b7ðDtoCÞi;t þ b8ðIntÞ2i;t  b9ðMngprcÞ2i;t þ ei;t ð2Þ
The relationships shown in the benchmark equation (Table 5a in the last column) are
again maintained in the last column of Table 5b where all of the explanatory variables,
interaction terms, and squared terms are included in the estimationmodel. R&D intensity
and managerial practices have positive impacts on firm performance while intangible
assets still seem to have a negative impact. The interaction terms, however, have positive
coefficients, apart from intangibles with managerial practices. The squared term of
intangibles, however, has a positive coefficient, which confirms the inverse U-shaped
nature of intangible assets.
4.3. The role of financial leverage in the innovation and firm performance relationship
Firms with high financial leverage or financial constraints are expected to behave
differently than others, and therefore, they need to be analysed in detail. The joint
impact of managerial practices, R&D and intangible assets should differ with financial
constraints; a firm with higher financial constraints will cut R&D investments or
operational expenses such as salaries, wages and skills training. To examine the
impact of financial leverage, starting from Table 6, we introduced leverage, and
interaction terms with leverage to show how managerial practices and innovation
impact firm performance in financially constrained firms. When leverage alone is
added to estimation, it has a negative impact; this is in line with the previous literature.
However, we argue that this may change for a firm with better managerial practices



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table 6 column (8), leverage on its own has a negative impact on firm performance.
However, in columns (9) through (11), the impacts turn positive when leverage is
interacted with managerial practices and R&D; intangibles and managerial practice; and
finally, intangibles and R&D, one by one and together in column (12). The positive
impact of managerial practices and R&D jointly means firms with better managerial
practices and R&D performance, in general, can overcome the negative impact of
leverage. The following equation (3) is estimated and shown in the last column of
Table 6.
PMi;t ¼ b0 þ b1PMi;t1  b2ðIntÞi;t þ b3logR&Di;t þ b5ðMngprcÞi;t
b4ðIntÞi;t  R&Di;t þ b5ðMngPrcÞi;t  logR&Di;t b6ðMngPrcÞi;t  ðIntÞi;t
þb7ðDtoCÞi;t þ b8ðIntÞ2i;;t þ b9ðMngprcÞ2i;;t þ b10ðDtoCÞi;t  ðIntÞi;t  R&Di;t
b11ðDtoCÞi;t:  ðMngprcÞi;t  logRnDi;t  b12ðDtoCÞi;t  ðMngprcÞi;t  ðIntÞi;t
þb8ðIntÞ2i;;t þ b9ðMngprcÞ2i;;t þ ei;t ð3Þ
In Table 6, we use leverage, and interactions with leverage to analyse situations with
financial constraints. In columns (9) to (12), we added leverage interactions. In columns
(13) to (15), however, we added squared terms of intangibles and managerial practices
separately and together in the estimation to show the impact of leverage on innovation
performance in the presence of nonlinearity. Results suggest that the joint impact of
R&D, managerial practices and intangibles are positive for firms without leverage;
however, when we look at firms with financial leverage, the relationship changes. While
firms that combine R&D and intangibles tend to be impacted positively from leverage,
leverage otherwise still has a negative impact on firms.
4.4. The impact of the recent financial crisis on the innovation–firm performance
relationship
When we conducted our estimation with the full sample, we found that intangible assets
had a negative impact on firm performance. However, these hypotheses as in the existing
literature suggested that intangibles have a positive impact on firm performance. Because
our full sample covers the periods before crisis and post-crisis, we, therefore, want to
observe the relationship of managerial practices, innovation and firm performance both
before and after the crisis, as well as to look at the puzzle on the effect of intangible
assets. Therefore, in Table 7, we divide our analysis into two parts: before the crisis
(before 2008) and after the crisis (2008 and later). The estimations in Table 7 show the
impact of intangibles on firm performance is both positive and negative in two sub-
periods (i.e., before and after the crisis).
Before the crisis, intangibles have a positive impact on firm performance. After the
crisis period, this turns negative. Having a higher amount of intangible assets probably
helped these companies before the crisis. However, they may not have had enough
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regarding company valuation after the crisis, investors pay more attention to the amount
of tangible assets companies hold, not just intangible assets. In other words, total assets
matter more after the crisis, with a change in perception. Therefore, companies that had
better performance before the crisis no longer sustain the same performance after the
crisis, as they no longer benefit from their over-valued intangible assets, and this causes a
decline in their performance.
Additionally, the results in Table 7 are consistent with Table 5b, meaning that apart
from intangible assets, the remaining variables, including managerial practices, R&D
and leverage have the same effect before and after the crisis. Also, squared terms of
intangible assets and managerial practices are positive and significant before the crisis,
whereas the squared term of intangible assets is still positive and themanagerial practices
squared term turns insignificant after the crisis. In the pre-crisis period in Table 7
(column (1) to (4)), even after introducing the interaction terms of intangible assets,
R&D and managerial practices, the intangible assets and their joint impact remain
positive.
However, in the post-crisis period, as shown in Table 7 (columns (5) to (9)),
intangible assets have a negative impact. This creates a motivation for us to further
focus on intangibles before and after the crisis, as the valuation perception of
intangible assets changed following the crisis. This paper justifies why one should
look at this relationship separately for the pre-crisis and post-crisis sub-periods. Firms
that are R&D-intensive tend to perform well, regardless of crisis conditions.
Nevertheless, for firms with only intangibles, the impact is negative. This is because
intangibles are only valued higher during good times and tend to be valued lower in
bad times when investors want to ensure that the company has enough tangible assets.
Should a company not have tangible assets, it is perceived as more risky which hinders
investment.
In Table 8, we estimate our model from Table 6 for pre- and post-crisis periods.
R&D and managerial practices are consistently positive in both pre- and post-crisis
periods. However, intangibles are positive again before the crisis and turn negative
post-crisis. In Table 8, all the interaction terms, the joint impact of all three 
managerial practices, R&D and intangibles  are negative before the crisis.
Additionally, leverage has an adverse effect throughout the pre-crisis period, with a
negative coefficient. As firms’ leverage ratio was high before the crisis, it had an
enormous negative impact on firm performance during the pre-crisis period. However,
this varies after the crisis, as firms’ leverage ratios began to decline. Additionally, the
joint impact of intangibles and R&D is positive when interacting with leverage, both
before and after the crisis. This indicates that firms that focus jointly on R&D and
intangibles perform better, regardless of the financial constraints, both pre- and post-
crisis. Nevertheless, the same is not valid for managerial practices and R&D, because
they have a positive joint impact before the crisis and a negative joint impact post-
crisis, while their joint impact with leverage is negative, in both pre- and post-crisis
periods.
Also, the joint impact of managerial practices and R&D is positive on firm
performance (pre-crisis and post-crisis), while their interaction with leverage had an
adverse impact on firm performance in both periods. This result indicates that even in a
financial crisis, firms that combine R&D with better management practices always
perform better than other firms. Also, before the crisis, firms with or without financial



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































because both the interaction of R&D and managerial practices, with or without leverage,
shows a positive coefficient before the crisis. While the pre-crisis leverage ratio is
negative, the post-crisis leverage ratio declines overall, and therefore the overall impact
of leverage on firm performance is no longer negative.
However, signs of the breakdownof leverage interactions appear after the crisis, shifting
towards the point where the interaction of R&D and managerial practices with leverage is
no longer positive and the interaction of R&D and intangibles with leverage is still
positive. Lastly, in Table 8, the final point we analysed was the impact of squared terms of
intangibles and managerial practices on firm performance. We looked at whether the
inverse U-shaped relationship found in our data is maintained in both pre- and post-crisis
periods. We found that the squared terms of both intangible assets and managerial
practices are positive and significant during pre- and post-crisis sub-periods.
4.5. Robustness checks
Our results remain insensitive to various robustness tests. To provide unbiased effects of
intellectual capital on firm performance, we confirm our results using two alternative
controls. In Table 9, for a robustness check, we replaced intangible assets with total
assets and re-estimated the models from Table 6. So, instead of using intangible assets as
an explanatory variable, we use total assets and check each interaction term accordingly,
by replacing intangible assets with total assets within these interactions. All the
relationships found in Table 6 remain insensitive to the robustness check we conducted
in Table 9. Investigating the impact of total assets on firm performance, we find that
greater total assets have a positive influence on firm performance. It also reveals that,
although intangible assets have a negative impact on firm performance, total assets have
a positive impact, because total assets matter more to firm performance after the crisis,
due to a change in the valuation of intangibles. We know that intangibles were
overvalued during the pre-crisis period and the valuation changed in the post-crisis
period. To justify that point we conduct further tests.
As a second robustness, we replaced intangibles with total assets and re-estimated
our models in Table 10. These results validate that total assets are positive after the
crisis, meaning that instead of intangibles, firms started to focus more on total assets.
In Table 10, we estimate the impact of leverage, while replacing intangibles with total
assets in both the pre- and post-crisis parts of the table. Results are consistent with our
expectations on total assets having a positive impact on firm performance in the post-
crisis period. Total assets, therefore tangible assets, matter more following a crisis. We
found that managerial practices and R&D have a positive impact on firm performance
both before and after the crisis, while intangible assets were important in the pre-crisis
period, and total assets became more important in the post-crisis period. The
interaction terms are also replaced with interactions with total assets. Thus, before the
crisis, firms that combined total assets with high R&D intensity had a better
performance, while the same impact jointly with leverage is negative before the crisis
and positive after the crisis. This indicates that firms focusing on total assets and R&D
perform better following a crisis. In the post-crisis, financially constrained firms
benefit jointly from total assets and R&D rather than the positive joint impact of total
asset and managerial practices in financially constrained firms in the pre-crisis period.
Therefore, the positive joint impact for the firms with financial constraints shifts






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are in line with Hall (2010) and Hall and Lerner (2010) which explain why we have a
negative coefficient for intangibles.
5. Conclusion
This paper focuses on estimating the relationship between innovation and firm
performance. While the traditional view of innovation is on R&D, modern innovation
focuses on better managerial practices. Solely focusing on traditional innovation is less
effective in firm performance than improving managerial practices. If firms concentrate
more on better managerial practices through organisational capital enhancements such as
new strategies, new targets and process development, and through human capital such as
improving employee’s expertise and knowledge, additional training andmeasurement of
skills, and incentives to increase their skills, the contribution of innovation to firm
performance will be higher. We, therefore, integrated these two strands of literature to
examine whether managerial practices make a difference in the relationship between
innovation and performance, using firm-level data from the UK over the period
1992–2014, applying dynamic system GMM that helps overcome the problem of
heterogeneity and endogeneity in the dataset.
Our analyses show that firms that are R&D intensive tend to perform well, regardless
of the crisis. However, for firms that have only intangibles, the impact is negative
because intangibles are only valued higher during good times. During bad times, the
valuation of intangibles declines. That is because, during bad times, investors seek
tangible assets. As Hall (2010) stated, intangibles are not counted as collateral. A
company that does not possess tangible assets is perceived as riskier and investors avoid
this risk. Companies who are considered good performers are expected to use intangible
assets (such as patents, brand, trademark and trade secrets) and create tangibles out of
them. For instance, the technology company Apple has higher intangible assets;
however, it is successful because it can turn innovative activities into assets. In contrast,
some start-up companies may have good ideas (intangibles), but if those intangible
efforts are not turned into real assets, they are perceived as non-performers.
One of the key contributions of the paper is on intangible assets and their impact on
firm’s performance in the pre- and the post-crisis periods. More specifically, intangible
assets were over-valued before the crisis and the valuation perception changed in the
post-crisis period. Thus, intangibles have a negative impact in the post-crisis period (and
the negative impact dominates the full sample) and therefore total assets are critical to
firm’s performance following the crisis. Intangible assets are then replaced with total
assets, as good performing firms may have higher tangible assets than intangibles.
Following the crisis, total assets did matter more in improving firm performance along
with R&D activity, rather than intangibles that did not reflect their true valuation in the
pre-crisis period. Moreover, we found an inverse U-shaped relationship between the
firms’ profitability with managerial practices and intangible assets. An inverse U-shaped
curve of intangibles indicates that there is a threshold level for intangible assets, up to
which intangible assets tend to have a positive impact on firm performance and above
which the effect starts declining.
Not all firms benefit equally from intellectual capital. As suggested by Bloom and Van
Reenen (2007, 2009 and 2010), better-managed firms perform better. Firms that focus on
strategies and modern innovation tend to outperform others that focus solely on
traditional innovation. The ability to perform better is therefore limited without changing
managerial practices or making process or product innovation. However, firms that focus
on both traditional innovation via R&D, andmodern innovation via changingmanagerial
practices, tend to perform better in terms of profitability. Our findings also show that
leverage has an adverse impact on firm performance over the sample period, but firms
with better managerial practices and innovative activities derive a positive effect from
leverage. Additionally, the paper shows that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the
impact of intangible assets on firm’s performance, when complemented with R&D
activity, was positive. We infer from this that, even during and after the crisis, the firms
that focus on R&D and intangibles tend to overcome the negative impact of the financial
crisis better than others. Because the firms that continually focus on innovation can create
new processes and products, they generate higher productivity and thereby enable
greater competitive advantage.
In summary, we have three main contributions. First, we find that the firms which
focus on R&D activities jointly with better managerial practices tend to show a positive
impact on their performance. Second, higher intangible assets are only beneficial in
improving firm performance when they are combined with R&D activity in the post-
crisis period, while in the pre-crisis period, intangibles did not reflect their true valuation
which became apparent in the post-crisis period, explaining the mixed effect on firm
performance. Third, we show that the impact of leverage on firm performance was
negative over the sample period as expected, but firms with better managerial practices
and innovative activities derive a positive effect from higher leverage. Finally, the paper
finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between intangible assets and performance,
supporting the Schumpeterian theory of creative destruction.
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